In a monetary economy with downwardly rigid wages, the central banker should target a low, but strictly positive, in ‡ation rate.
Introduction
The idea that nominal wages are more downwardly rigid, than upwardly rigid, has a long history in economics. Earlier references include Keynes (1936) , who discusses the role of downward nominal wage rigidity in business cycle ‡uctuations; Tobin (1972) , who suggests that a positive rate of in ‡ation may be socially bene…cial in an economy where cutting nominal wages is privately costly;
and Harris and Holmstrom (1982) , who show that the optimal long-term contract has an insurance component whereby the (real) wage never falls in a setup where …rms are risk-neutral and workers are risk-averse.
Furthermore, downward nominal wage rigidity has received ample empirical support from a large body of research based on micro data at the individual, …rm and industry levels. Research on wage changes at the individual level …nds that its distribution has a peak at zero, features few wage cuts, and is positively skewed. This is so even in countries, like Japan and Switzerland, where in ‡ation is very low or even negative. 1 Surveys on attitudes towards nominal wage cuts show that both workers and …rms dislike them, but for di¤erent reasons. Workers perceive nominal wage cuts as unfair (Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1986) , while …rms are generally concerned about the e¤ect of wage cuts on morale and, in practice, only cut wages when facing bankruptcy (Bewley, 1995, and Campbell and Kamlani, 1997 ).
This paper is concerned with the macroeconomic implications of downward nominal wage rigidity, in particular for monetary policy. To that end we build a small-scale, dynamic stochastic general-equilibrium (DSGE) model where the cost of adjusting prices and wages may be asymmetric. We follow the Neo Keynesian literature in postulating a simple mechanism to model nominal frictions in the goods and labor markets, but relax the assumption that frictions are symmetric around the current price or wage. 2 In particular, we adopt an adjustment cost speci…cation based on the linex function due to Varian (1974) , which includes the quadratic function in Rotemberg (1982) as a special case. Hence in our model, adjustment costs depend not only of the size but also on the sign of the adjustment. For example, a nominal wage cut may involve a larger frictional cost that an increase of exactly the same magnitude. The nonlinear model based on a second-order approximation is estimated by the Simulated Method of Moments (SMM) and a simple t test is used to evaluate whether the macro data supports the view that nominal wages are downwardly rigid.
This project builds on-but makes a distinct contribution from-our previous work; Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) carries out the analysis using a cashless economy and is primarily concerned with the optimal amount of "grease" in ‡ation. In contrast, this paper studies the positive implications of downward wage rigidity-which are not examined in our earlier contribution-and does so in the context of a fully- ‡edged monetary economy. From the modeling perspective, this paper extends Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) by characterizing the role of money as a medium of exchange. Modeling money is important for the normative analysis of monetary policy. In the cashless environment of Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), downward wage rigidly trivially induces a positive optimal rate of in ‡ation, as was anticipated by Tobin (1972) . Thus, the object of interest in our previous paper is not the level of in ‡ation per se, but rather the extra optimal in ‡ation induced by asymmetric costs compared with symmetric costs (that is, "grease" in ‡ation).
In a monetary economy, in ‡ation-or even modest de ‡ation as far as the nominal interest rate is positive-leads to the ine¢ cient economizing in money balances. Thus, in the absence of nominal frictions, the optimal in ‡ation rate is negative and equal to the Friedman's rule (Friedman, 1969) .
In many previous models with nominal frictions, optimal in ‡ation rate is larger than the Friedman's rule but still negative (see, for example, Rotemberg and Woodford 1997). However, if nominal wages are downwardly rigid, the monetary authority faces a non-trivial trade-o¤. Explicit modeling of this trade-o¤ is important because there is currently a discrepancy between economic theory and monetary policy in practice. The former prescribes a zero-to-negative optimal in ‡ation rate while the latter targets low, but strictly positive, in ‡ation rates. In a sense, our quantitative analysis has the ‡avor of a (friendly) match between two old long-standing views of optimal monetary policy, namely those of James Tobin and Milton Friedman.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the model; Section 3 describes the data and method used to estimate the model, reports parameter estimates, and studies aggregate implications of downward nominal wage rigidly; Section 4 computes the optimal in ‡ation rate and derives the optimal responses to shocks under the Ramsey policy that maximizes social welfare; Section 5 computes the optimal in ‡ation target under a strict targeting policy; and Section 6 concludes.
The Model
The economy consists of i ) a continuum of in…nitely-lived households with di¤erentiated job skills, ii ) a continuum of …rms that produce di¤erentiated goods using labor as sole input, and iii ) a government that implements monetary policy using a Taylor-type rule. Households and …rms interact in markets with frictions where adjusting nominal wages and prices involves convex and (possibly) asymmetric costs. The model is a monetary version of the one developed in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) and we refer the reader to that article for a more detailed discussion about functional forms and modeling assumptions.
Households
where E s denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time s; 2 (0; 1) is the discount factor, U ( ) is the instantaneous utility function, c h t is consumption, and n h t is hours worked. Consumption is an aggregate of all di¤erentiated goods available in the economy
where > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between goods. The price of this consumption bundle is
where P j;t is the price of good j: P t serves as the aggregate price index in our model economy and the gross rate of price in ‡ation is then t+1 = P t+1 =P t :
Households choose their nominal wage taking as given the …rms'demand for their labor type and face a convex cost whenever they adjust its value. This cost is represented by the function (see Varian, 1974 )
where 0 and are cost parameters. For the analysis below, it is important to keep in mind two special cases of this function. First, when ! 0; (4) becomes a quadratic function. The symmetry of the quadratic form implies that nominal wage increases or decreases of the same magnitude are equally costly. Second, when > 0; cutting nominal wages is generally more costly than raising them and so wages are downwardly rigid. These two cases are plotted in Figure 1 .
Another special case that is nested in (4) is the "L"shape used by Benigno and Ricci (2008) , which corresponds to the situation where ! 1 and implies that wage cuts are in…nitely costly while wage increases are costless.
The household's budget constraint is
where
where ; a and b are positive parameters and c h t =m h t is the consumption velocity of money. The linear representation of the household's disutility of labor is based on the indivisible-labor model due to Hansen (1985) . The form of the transaction cost function is due to Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) and implies a money demand elasticity with respect to consumption equal to unity.
Utility maximization implies an optimal consumption demand for good j of the form
where =( 1) is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price of good j: Optimal money demand is implicitly de…ned by
where t is the household's marginal utility. The term b a(c h
Firms
Firm j 2 [0; 1] produces a di¤erentiated good using the technology
where y j;t is output of good j, n j;t is labor input, x t is an aggregate productivity shock, and 2 (0; 1) is a constant parameter. The productivity shock follows the process
where 2 ( 1; 1) and u t is a disturbance term. The disturbance is independently and identically distributed (i:i:d:) with mean zero and standard deviation u :
The labor input is an aggregate of di¤erentiated labor supplied by households. The aggregator takes the form
where > 1 is a parameter that determines the elasticity of substitution between labor types. The price of the labor input is
where W h t is the nominal wage demanded by the supplier of labor type h. Firms choose their nominal price taking as given the consumption demand for their good and subject to a convex cost for price changes. The real per-unit cost of a price change is
where P j;t is the nominal price of good j at time t, and 0 and & are cost parameters. As in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), we focus on the case where & ! 0 meaning that price adjustment costs are quadratic (Rotemberg, 1982) . 3 Firm j maximizes
is nominal pro…ts, which are transferred to households in the form of dividends. In the de…nition (14), c j;t denotes the total consumption demand for good j; which is simply the integral over the individual households'demands. That is, c j;t = 1 R 0 c h j;t dh: Pro…t maximization implies the optimal labor demand schedule
where =( 1) is the elasticity of demand with respect to the relative price of labor of type h:
Government
The government sets monetary policy using the interest rate rule
where 1 The government supplies the money balances that households demand at this interest rate using lump-sum transfers or taxes to adjusts the money stock. Hence,
where the right-hand side is seigniorage revenue.
Equilibrium
We focus on a symmetric equilibrium where all households and …rms are identical ex-post and so
Arrow-Debreu securities and bonds are not held by any household. Substituting the government budget constraint and the pro…ts of the (now) representative …rm into the budget constraint of the (now) representative household delivers the economy-wide resource constraint
This equation shows that price and wage adjustment cost are deadweight losses that reduce the quantity of output available for consumption. Since the losses are minimized when in ‡ation is zero, many models with sticky prices prescribe zero in ‡ation as a criterion for good policy.
Solution and Estimation
The model is solved by taking a second-order expansion of the optimality conditions, the resource constraint, and the monetary policy rule, around the model's deterministic steady state. 4 The 
Data
The data used to estimate the model are quarterly observations of hours worked, real consumption per capita, real money balances per capita, the price in ‡ation rate, the wage in ‡ation rate, and and the nominal interest rate is the e¤ective federal funds rate. The original interest rate series, which is quoted as a net annual rate, was transformed into a gross quarterly rate. Except for the nominal interest rate, all data are seasonally adjusted at the source. All series were logged and linearly detrended prior to the estimation of the model.
SMM Estimation
The second-order approximate solution of our nonlinear DSGE model is estimated using the Simu- We estimate twelve structural parameters. The parameters are those of the price and wage adjustment cost functions ( , and ), the transaction cost function (a and b), the monetary policy rule ( 1 , 2 ; 3 and v ), the productivity shock process ( and u ), and the consumption curvature in the utility function ( ). Additional information is used to …x the values of four parameters to economically plausible numbers during the estimation routine. These parameters are the curvature of the production function, the discount factor, and the elasticities of substitution between goods and between labor types ( and , respectively). Data from the U.S. National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) shows that the share of labor in total income is approximately 2=3 and, hence, a plausible value for is 1=3. The discount rate is set to 0:997; which is the inverse the average gross real interest rate during the sample period. Finally, the elasticities of substitution between goods and between labor types are …xed to = 1:1 and = 1:4; respectively, which are standard values in the literature.
In addition to the model with asymmetric wage adjustment costs, we also estimate the restricted model with quadratic costs that corresponds to the case where = 0: The restricted model provides a useful benchmark to evaluate the implications of downward nominal wage rigidity.
Parameter Estimates
SMM estimates of the model parameters are reported in the …rst column of Table 1 . This result is interesting because the estimation approaches followed 5 We use an antithetic accelerator in the simulation of the arti…cial data. The idea is to increase the e¢ ciency of the …nite sample estimator of the moments by using (antithetic) variates that are deliberately induced to have a negative correlation. In practice, this means that the simulated sample consists of two subsamples of equal length: one based on a given draw of random innovations and another based on the negative values of the same draw. This strategy delivers the smallest possible correlation of 1 (see, Ripley, 1987) . in these two papers are rather di¤erent: We structurally estimate a full nonlinear DGSE model, while Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe compute their estimates from a reduced-form ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of consumption velocity on a constant and the nominal interest rate.
Both prices and wages are rigid in the sense that the null hypotheses = 0 and = 0 can be rejected at the one percent signi…cance level. 6 The wage asymmetry parameter is = 7146:3 (1840:4); which is positive and statistically di¤erent from zero. 7 Based on this result, we conclude that nominal wages are downwardly rigid. This …nding is important because, as we will show below, downward wage rigidity modi…es previous conclusions regarding the relative importance of price versus wage rigidity, the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks, and the optimal rate of in ‡ation.
Consider the restricted version of our model where = 0 so that adjustment costs are quadratic and, hence, symmetric. Parameter estimates for this model are reported in the second column of Table 1 . In this case, ( ) fully captures the degree of nominal wage (price) rigidity. Since is much larger than (711:3 and 42:0; respectively), one is tempted to conclude that wages are generally more rigid than prices. In contrast, in the model with asymmetric adjustment costs, nominal rigidity depends on the asymmetry parameter as well. Since is quantitatively close to but the wage asymmetry parameter is positive and large, we conclude instead that prices and wages are similarly upwardly rigid but that wages are more downwardly rigid than prices. This is more that a semantic re…nement because, as we will show below, the e¤ects of monetary shocks are very di¤erent in the models with quadratic and asymmetric adjustment costs.
Finally, the coe¢ cients of the Taylor-type rule are in line with previous estimates reported elsewhere in the literature (for example, Taylor, 1999 , and the references therein).
Impulse Responses
We now study the implications of downward nominal wage rigidity for the economy's response to a monetary policy shock. 8 Since the responses of nonlinear dynamic systems typically depend on the sign, size and timing of the shock (see Gallant, Rossi and Tauchen, 1993, and Koop, Pesaran and Potter, 1996), our experiments involve shocks of di¤erent signs and sizes. More precisely, we consider innovations to the interest rate rule of +2; +1; 1 and 2 standard deviations. A positive shock leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate and is therefore contractionary, 6 Since the null lays at the boundary of the parameter space, the distribution of the t statistic is not standard (see, Andrews, 2001 ). Hence, this result needs to be interpreted with caution and is best taken as indicative only. 7 Though bigger, this estimate is not statistically di¤erent from 3844:4 as reported in our previous work (Kim and Ruge-Murcia, 2009). In particular, our previous estimate is contained in the ninety-…ve percent con…dence interval around the estimate reported in this paper. 8 In preliminary work, we also examined the e¤ects of productivity shocks. These results are not reported here in order to save space, but they are available from the corresponding author upon request. while a negative shock is expansionary. In all cases, we assume that a shock take place when the system is at its stochastic steady state. That is, when all variables are equal to their unconditional mean. Figure 2 plots the responses of consumption, output, price in ‡ation, wage in ‡ation, real wage, nominal interest, real interest, and real money balances in the economy where wages are downwardly rigid. In all panels, the stochastic steady state is represented by the horizontal line, and the vertical axis is the percentage deviation of each variable from its deterministic steady state. Hence, the distance between this horizontal line and zero re ‡ects the model's departure from certainty equivalence. For instance, uncertainty induces lower average levels of consumption and output than the deterministic steady state as a result of the precautionary savings motive on the part of households. In the …gure, the rates of price in ‡ation, wage in ‡ation, nominal interest and real interest are annualized.
The most obvious observation in Figure 2 is that, when wages are downwardly rigid, the e¤ects of monetary policy shocks are asymmetric. For example, a contractionary shock produces a quantitatively larger and more persistent movement in consumption and output than an expansionary shock of the same magnitude. Starting at the unconditional mean, the contractionary shock of size +2 standard deviations yields an initial decrease of 1:73 percent in consumption and 0:85 percent in output, while the expansionary shock of size 2 yields increases of 1:03 and 0:53, respectively. Also, the quantitative e¤ects of the larger shock (say +2 standard deviations) are more than twice those of the smaller one (that is, +1 standard deviation). The …nding that contractionary monetary policy shocks produce larger real e¤ects than expansionary ones is line with evidence reported by Cover (1992). Cover performs OLS regressions of output on a constant, measures of positive and negative money supply shocks, and other controls, and he …nds that contractionary shocks have a larger e¤ect on output than expansionary shocks. Furthermore, he rejects the hypothesis that contractionary and expansionary shocks induce output changes of the same magnitude.
Monetary shocks also have an asymmetric e¤ect on price and wage in ‡ation. The contractionary shock of size +2 induces an initial decrease of 0:37 percent in price in ‡ation, while the expansionary shock of the same magnitude induces an initial increase of 1:26 percent. The economy returns to the stochastic steady state faster in the former than in the latter case. Since price rigidity is symmetric, the asymmetric response of price in ‡ation is entirely due to the downward rigidity of nominal wages through general equilibrium e¤ects. Also, in this case, the quantitative e¤ects of the large negative shock are more than twice those of the smaller one, but the converse is true for positive shocks.
The asymmetry is especially pronounced in the case of wage in ‡ation. In all experiments, a monetary shock delivers an increases in wage in ‡ation. Positive shocks induce larger responses than negative shocks of the same magnitude, and feature almost no overshooting. These responses on the part of price and wage in ‡ation imply that real wages rise after a monetary shock regardless of whether the shock is expansionary or contractionary. 9 In this sense, real wages are downwardly rigid with respect to monetary policy shocks. The fact that the real wage may rise following an expansionary monetary shock moderates the expected increase in output and consumption and explains the asymmetric e¤ect of monetary shocks on these two variables. 
Optimal Monetary Policy
In this section, we study optimal policy in a monetary economy where wages are downwardly rigid. In particular, we consider the problem of a government that follows the Ramsey policy of maximizing the representative household's welfare subject to the aggregate resource constraint and the optimality conditions for …rms and households. The government is assumed to use the same discount factor as households in evaluating future utilities and to credibly commit to implementing the optimal policy. We again approximate the model to the second order, and the resulting decision rules are used to compute the optimal average in ‡ation rate and the optimal responses to productivity shocks.
Optimal In ‡ation Target
The optimal average rate of gross in ‡ation is de…ned as the level at the stochastic steady state under the Ramsey policy. Recall that, by de…nition, the unconditional mean of all variables is their stochastic steady state. We compute these means from the decision rules using the parameter values reported in the left column of Table 1 . Results indicate that mean gross in ‡ation is 1.0040, meaning that optimal net in ‡ation is 0.40 percent per year. In contrast to earlier literature on optimal monetary policy, 10 the optimal (net) in ‡ation rate is positive. That is, for an economy with downwardly rigid wages, the bene…ts of positive in ‡ation conjectured by Tobin (1972) overcome Friedman's (1969) general prescription of negative in ‡ation. As in the cashless economy in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009), this result is driven by prudence: The Ramsey planner prefers to incur the systematic, but small, price and wage adjustment costs associated with positive in ‡ation rate rather than taking the chance of having to pay the large adjustment costs required to implement nominal wage decreases. However, this is even so after taking into account the bene…ts of negative in ‡ation as pointed out by Friedman. 11 We now examine how the optimal in ‡ation rate varies with the volatility of the productivity shock. Figure 4 plots optimal in ‡ation as a function of the standard deviation of the productivity innovation. The range of the standard deviation is [0; 0:025]: Notice that when there is no uncertainty, meaning that u = 0; optimal in ‡ation is 0:9994: Thus, without a precautionary motive, optimal in ‡ation falls between the Friedman's rule and zero. As volatility increases, optimal in ‡ation increases in u : The relation is quadratic because the decision rules are linear in the conditional variance of productivity and, hence, quadratic in its standard deviation. The value for optimal average in ‡ation reported above, namely 1:0040; corresponds to the SMM estimate of u at 0:011:
Finally, it is interesting to compute optimal grease in ‡ation for this monetary economy. Fol- The optimal in ‡ation rate in this monetary economy (which is 40 basis points) is larger than in the cashless economy in our previous paper (which was 35 basis points). Note, however, that the parameters used to compute optimal in ‡ation in both papers are not the same because the two models are individually estimated. When we compute optimal in ‡ation in the cashless economy using these paper's estimates, the optimal rate would be about 5 basis points. in ‡ation implied by asymmetric costs compared with symmetric costs. As we reported above, for the case where = 7146:3 and wages are, therefore, downwardly rigid, optimal in ‡ation is 1:0040.
For the where = 0 and wage adjustment costs are quadratic, optimal in ‡ation is 0:9989: Notice that in this case we recover the result reported in earlier literature. That is, in a monetary economy with sticky prices and wages, optimal (net) in ‡ation lies between the Friedman's rule and zero.
Optimal grease in ‡ation is simply 1:0040 0:9989 = 0:0051, that is 0.51 percent per year. This value is roughly similar to the one of 0:35 reported in our previous work. This result implies that the amount of grease in ‡ation originally computed in Kim and Ruge-Murcia (2009) for a cashless economy is robust to modeling money as a medium of exchange.
Optimal Responses
The optimal responses to a productivity shock are reported in Figure 5 . Following a positive productivity shock, consumption and output increase before returning to their stochastic steady state. An exogenous productivity increase permits a larger output with the same inputs and this creates a wealth e¤ect that allows consumption to rise today and in the future. A negative productivity shock has the converse e¤ects. There is some asymmetry between positive and negative shocks, with the latter inducing larger adjustments than the former.
Positive (negative) shocks induce an initial decrease (increase) in price in ‡ation. There is some asymmetry with respect to the shock size and the dynamics involve in ‡ation overshooting its long-run value. The real wage increases following a positive shock and decreases following a negative one, with the responses proportionally larger in the former case. In this sense, real wages are downwardly rigid with respect to productivity shocks under the optimal policy.
There is considerable asymmetry in the responses of wage in ‡ation, the nominal and real interest rates and real money balances to productivity shocks. In the case of wage in ‡ation, all shocks induce an increase in wage in ‡ation. In particular, following a negative productivity shock and in order to avoid incurring the large costs associated with nominal wage cuts, the Ramsey policy involves wage increases throughout and instead the decrease in the real wage is implemented via an increase in the price level. This result illustrates Tobin's proposition that a positive rate of price in ‡ation may be socially bene…cial in an economy with downwardly rigid wages.
Real money balances decrease (increase) after negative (positive) shocks. Responses are asymmetric in that the e¤ects of a negative shock are larger than those of a positive shock of the same magnitude. Since, by construction, the money stock is held …xed in this experiment, this asymmetry is due to the asymmetric responses to productivity shocks on the part of consumption and the price level.
The optimal policy involves an increase in the nominal interest rate after a negative technology shock and a decrease after a positive shock. The initial responses of the real interest rate are the opposite: The real interest rate falls after a negative shock and rises after a positive one. However, after the second period the real interest rate responses are reversed and, therefore, equivalent to those of the nominal rate. Note that responses are asymmetric. For example, the shock of size 2 induces an increase in nominal rate of 1:21 percent while the positive shock of the same size induces a decrease of 0:58. The very asymmetric response in the nominal interest rate under the optimal policy allows a smoother, less asymmetric response on the part of consumption, output and real balances to productivity shocks. 12 
Optimized Simple Policy
In order to study the normative implications of downward nominal wage rigidity under a policy more realistic than the unconstrained Ramsey optimal policy, we now compute the in ‡ation rate that delivers the highest (unconditional) welfare when the monetary authority follows a simple policy rule that strictly hits an in ‡ation target regardless the state of the economy. Table 2 reports unconditional welfare, expressed in consumption equivalents, for di¤erent values of the target. The benchmark policy is the Friedman's rule, whereby the target is the discount rate, that is, (0:997) 4 = 0:9881 at the annual rate. Notice in Table 2 welfare decreases slowly as in ‡ation rises beyond the optimal target, actual in ‡ation ranges like one used in Canada from 1 to 3 percent deliver higher welfare than the Friedman's rule and strict price stability (i.e., a net in ‡ation rate equal to zero). We view this result as providing support for the low, but strictly positive, in ‡ation targets used in many countries. 
